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Abstract. This article aims to provide a consistent explication of the doctrine 
of Divine Simplicity. To achieve this end, a re-construal of the doctrine is made 
within an “aspectival trope-theoretic” metaphysical framework, which will ul-
timately enable the doctrine to be elucidated in a consistent manner, and the 
Plantingian objections raised against it will be shown to be unproblematic.
I. INTRODUCTION
I.1 The Doctrine of Divine Simplicity
The Doctrine of Divine Simplicity (hereafter, the DDS), in its most basic 
sense, claims that God is not composed of “parts”. In understanding this spe-
cific claim, we first need to make a distinction between two different types of 
parts: “proper” parts and “improper” parts. A part is a portion of any given 
entity. Hence, if a portion of a given entity is less than the whole entity itself, 
then it is a proper part, whereas if a portion of a given entity is not less than 
the whole itself, then it is an “improper part”. In contemporary mereology, as 
expressed by Aaron Cotnoir and Achille Varzi, the proper parthood relation 
P can be formally construed as such:
(1) (Proper Parthood): Pxy ∧ ¬x = y.1
According to this conception of proper parthood, x is a proper part of y iff x 
is distinct from y. That is, something is a proper part of an entity in the case in 
which it is numerically distinct from the entity itself — a finger is numerically 
distinct from a hand, and thus is a proper part of it. Conversely, something is an 
improper part of an entity in the case in which it is numerically identical to the 
1 Aaron Cotnoir and Achille Varzi, Mereology (Oxford Univ. Press, 2021), 23.
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entity itself — a hand is numerically identical to a fist, and thus is an improper 
part of it.2 Thus, this contemporary metaphysical conception of parts ties part-
hood to the relation of identity; conceiving of a part of an entity in the proper 
sense is conceiving a portion of that entity in a manner in which it is incompat-
ible with that portion being the whole entity — the whole includes something 
else that is not included within that portion, which results in the latter being of 
a different mereological level than the former.3 Whilst conceiving of a part in 
the improper sense is conceiving a portion of an entity in a manner in which it 
is compatible with that portion being the whole entity — nothing in the portion 
lies outside the whole, and nothing in the whole lies outside the portion, which 
results in the latter being of the same mereological level as the former. Taking 
this parthood distinction into account, we can plausibly construe the DDS as a 
doctrine that negates the compositional nature of God in a proper sense:
(2) (DDS): God is a simple entity through lacking proper parts.
Thus, according to the DDS, no portion of God is numerically distinct from 
him. God is a being who intrinsically within himself does not have any divi-
sion or ontological composition. In short: there is nothing that is in God, 
that is not God.4 The primary motivation for this lack of complexity in God 
is grounded upon the fact that any entity composed of proper parts would be 
dependent upon those parts for being what it is. However, God is tradition-
ally understood to be an ontologically independent being that is the most 
fundamental entity in the hierarchical structure of reality and thus cannot be 
so dependent. Given this, God must be such that he does not have any sort of 
complexity involving composition. In further elucidating this fact, Thomas 
Morris has helpfully presented a threefold denial of the type of complexity 
that is posited by the DDS:
(3) (Spatial Simplicity): God has no proper spatial parts.
(4) (Temporal Simplicity): God has no proper temporal parts.
(5) (Property Simplicity): God has no proper metaphysical parts.5
2 Peter Simons, Parts: A Study in Ontology (Clarendon Press, 1987), 11.
3 Giorgio Lando, Mereology: A Philosophical Introduction (Bloomsbury, 2017), 142.
4 James Dolezal, God Without Parts (Pickwick Publications, 2011), xvi.
5 Thomas V. Morris, Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology (InterVarsity 
Press, 1991), 114.




































Focusing on Property Simplicity,6 the denial made here by an adherent of the 
DDS is that of God not exemplifying any numerically distinct properties (i.e. 
proper metaphysical parts). Since if God were to exemplify these properties, 
he would be dependent upon them in order to be what he is. Yet, again, as God 
cannot be dependent in specific this way, he thus must not be the bearer of any 
properties. Rather, any intrinsic property attributable to God must be numeri-
cally identical to him. So, for example, if the intrinsic property of goodness is 
attributed to God, then one is not properly attributing to him an ontologically 
distinct property that he exemplifies. Rather, God is instead taken to be identi-
cal with his goodness (and all the other properties that are attributed to him as 
well). Moreover, given that God is identical to each of his properties, one must 
also infer that his properties are identical to each other due to the numerical 
identity relation having the following formal characteristics:
(6) (Reflexivity): ∀x R(x, x).
(7) (Symmetry): ∀x∀y (R(x, y) → R(y, x)).
(8) (Transitivity): ∀x∀y∀z [(R(x, y) ∧ R(y, z)) → R(x, z)].
By the identity relation having the characteristics of (6)–(8),7 God’s identity 
with his goodness and his power entails the fact of his goodness being identi-
cal to his power (and, again, for all of the other properties that are attributed 
to him). Thus, according to the DDS, there is, firstly, no numerical distinction 
between God and his properties and, secondly, there is no numerical distinc-
tion between each of God’s properties as well.
The Property Simplicity of God that is posited by the DDS is at the heart 
of the division between adherents of the doctrine, who we can term the “Clas-
sical Theists”, and certain individuals who take issue with the doctrine, who 
6 This article focuses on investigating and defending what Jeffrey Brower terms a “Property 
Account” of the DDS, which features in: Jeffrey Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity”, 
Faith and Philosophy 25 (2008): 4. Thus, the following problems raised against it are not to be 
taken to be an issue against the alternative accounts of the DDS, such as Brower’s “Truthmaker 
Account”, which also features in: Brower, “Simplicity”, 4. Nevertheless, for a helpful overview of 
the type of DDS accounts on offer, see Thomas Schärtl, “Divine Simplicity”, European Journal 
for Philosophy of Religion 10, no. 2 (2018).






































we can term the “Neo-Classical Theists”.8 That is, in the contemporary ana-
lytic theological literature, there are (at least) two ways for one to conceptu-
alise God’s nature: one way, according to the Classical Theists, is to conceive 
of God as a simple entity who does not have his properties as proper parts of 
him. Instead, God is identical to each of his properties under this conception 
and thus would not depend upon any external entity for him existing as he 
does. However, according to the Neo-Classical Theists, another way to con-
ceive of God is as a complex entity who has his properties as proper parts of 
him. Thus, under this conception, God is numerically distinct from his prop-
erties and, therefore, is dependent upon some external entities, namely his 
properties, in order for him to exist in the manner that he does. There is thus 
a radical distinction between these two conceptions of God’s nature, which 
can be illustrated as such (with the smaller ovals in the left image represent-
ing the parts of God, as posited by Neo-Classical Theism, and the double-
headed arrows in the right image representing an identity relation, as posited 
by Classical Theism):
Figure 1.1 Complex and Simple Conceptions of God
Alvin Plantinga,9 an adherent of Neo-Classical Theism, views the Classical 
Theist’s conception of the nature of God, and the DDS which it is built upon, 
as a “very hard saying”. One of the primary reasons why this is a “very hard 
saying” for Plantinga is that it seems to him that if God’s properties (such 
8 For a detailed explanation of these two theistic positions, see John Peckham, The Doctrine 
of God: Introducing the Big Questions (T&T Clark, 2019), 4–20.
9 Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have A Nature? (Marquette Univ. Press, 1980).




































as his goodness and power) were all identical to him, then, firstly, he would 
only possess one property (i.e. either goodness or power), which seems to be 
evidently false since God possesses a multiplicity of qualitatively differing 
properties — God’s goodness is qualitatively different from his power. We can 
call this issue the Many Properties Problem. Secondly, and a more pertinent 
worry for Plantinga, is the fact that if God were identical to the properties 
that are attributable to him, then given Leibniz’s Law, which can formally be 
defined as such:
(9) (Leibniz’s Law): ∀x∀y(x = y → (φ(x) ↔ φ(y)))
God must himself be a (self-exemplifying) property, which would bring forth 
a myriad of problems. As Plantinga notes,
no property could have created the world; no property could be omniscient, 
or, indeed, know anything at all. If God is a property, then he couldn’t be 
omniscient, or, indeed, know anything at all. If God is a property, then he 
isn’t a person but a mere abstract object; he has no knowledge, awareness, 
power, love or life. So taken, the simplicity doctrine seems to be an utter 
mistake.10
Thus, Plantinga thinks that if the DDS is true, then this would also entail that 
God is, in fact, a property. However, this is problematic as, in contemporary 
analytic thought, properties are regularly taken to be “abstract” entities that 
are causally inert. So, if God is a “property” or a collection of “properties”, 
he must also be an abstract entity and thus be causally inert. Yet, if that were 
indeed the case, then there will be a clear inconsistency with the mainline 
theistic position that construes God as the personal ultimate causal agent of 
all reality. Therefore, as Plantinga notes, an accurate conception of God re-
quires us to affirm that he is a concrete entity, and thus we cannot consistently 
hold to the conception of him being a simple entity as well.11 We can call this 
issue the Property-Identity Problem. On the basis of the prima facie success of 
the Many-Properties Problem and the Property-Identity Problem, Plantinga 
ultimately believes that DDS is unworthy of assent. A conceptualisation of 
God as a complex being is the only coherent way forward. Thus, the question 
becomes for the adherent of the DDS: how can one affirm this doctrine in 
light of these issues? One way to make this affirmation without having to face 
10 Plantinga, Does God Have A Nature?, 23.





































these issues is by one providing an alternative account of the DDS within a 
Neo-Classical Theistic framework. A particular individual who has sought to 
do just this is that of Richard Swinburne,12 who shares the same sympathies 
as Plantinga concerning the DDS’s coherence. As he writes,
how can God, who is a substance, an entity who possesses properties, be the 
same as those properties? And how can they be identical with each other? 
How can omnipotence be the same property as omniscience?13
Due to the difficulty in answering these questions, Swinburne ultimately re-
jects (what we can term) the strong DDS proposed by the Classical Theists. 
However, unlike Plantinga and certain other Neo-Classical Theists,14 Swin-
burne sees some merit in affirming the DDS, yet he believes that one must 
indeed proceed to formulate this doctrine in a different manner. This alter-
native formulation, which we can term the weak DDS (or the “harmonisa-
tion account”),15 firstly takes the divine nature to be reducible to one essential 
property, omnipotence (defined as the ability to perform any logically possible 
action). Secondly, this property is instantiated by, rather than identical to, 
God. Thirdly, the various other properties that are rightly predicated of God 
(such as omniscience, omnipresence, perfect freedom and perfect goodness 
etc.) are entailed by the possession of this one property — this property is 
such that it could not be had unless the other properties were had as well.16 
Positing an “entailment relation” here is the key move made by Swinburne 
for providing an alternative interpretation of the DDS — with the holding of 
this relation being grounded upon how these other properties are defined:17
12 Richard Swinburne, The Christian God (Clarendon Press, 1994), 160–68; Richard 
Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford Univ. Press, 2016), 258–59.
13 Swinburne, The Christian God, 162.
14 Other Neo-Classical Theists such as William Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal 
God (Oxford Univ. Press, 2013), 55–61.
15 For a further explanation of the harmonisation account and the positions of its other 
defenders, see Dolezal, God Without Parts, 136–44.
16 For a detailed explanation of why there is this entailment from the property of omnipotence, 
see Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, 174–75. Furthermore, this definition of omnipotence 
is a basic definition provided by Richard Swinburne, Is There a God? (Oxford Univ. Press, 
2010), 8, which is subject to certain counterexamples (such as the “McEar” objection). For 
these counterexamples and a more refined definition of omnipotence that does not face these 
counterexamples, see Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, 150–74.
17 Again, these definitions are basic definitions provided by Swinburne, The Christian God, 
6–13, which are also subject to certain counterexamples. For these counterexamples and some 





































Omniscience Knowing of all true propositions and believing no false prop-
osition.
Omnipresence Being cognizant of, and causally active at, every point of 
space.
Perfect Freedom Having no non-rational causal influence determining one’s 
choices.
Perfect Goodness Performing the best action/kind of action, if there is one, 
many good actions and no bad actions.
Table 1.1 Property Definition
By the divine properties being defined in this specific way, a basis is provided 
for these properties being entailed by the property of omnipotence; that is, 
they are derivable from this property which can be illustrated as such (with 
the single-headed arrows representing an entailment relation):
Figure 1.2 Property Entailment
more refined definitions of these properties that do not face these counterexamples, see Swin-
burne, The Coherence of Theism, 126–227. Furthermore, the properties listed here are a limited 
set of properties, with Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, 200–244, also taking the properties 
of eternality, being the creator of any universe that exists, being the source of moral obligation, 
ontological necessity, etc., to be entailed by the property of omnipotence. However, for space 





































So, for example, focusing on the derivability of the property of omniscience 
from the property of omnipotence, for God to be omnipotent, that is him 
having the ability to perform any logically possible action, then he must, at 
the minimum, possess knowledge of what occurred in the past (and what is 
occurring now in the present) in order for him to know of (and believe no 
false propositions about) what actions are logically possible for him to per-
form at any given point in time. Thus, to be omnipotent, God must also be 
omniscient, with this requirement holding for all of the other divine proper-
ties above as well. Given this entailment, the divine properties fit together so 
as to form a unified nature. The unity or harmonisation of the divine proper-
ties, according to Swinburne,18 is thus all that is required for a coherent con-
strual of the DDS. However, even though the weak DDS is indeed a coherent 
construal of the doctrine, the main criticism against this type of approach is 
that of it failing to capture the primary motivation for one holding to DDS in 
the first place, which, as noted previously, is that of preserving the ontological 
priority of God over all else, or, what, Plantinga terms, the “sovereignty-aseity” 
intuition.19 By the weak DDS”, abandonment of an identity relation between 
God and his properties, it is God’s properties themselves, rather than God, 
which seem to have priority, since he is dependent upon them in order for 
him to exist as God. Furthermore, it also seems as if God is, in some manner, 
“constructed” out of these properties, which serve as his proper parts, due to 
each being a “portion” of him that is less than him. In affirming this coherent 
construal of the DDS, we end up positing a complex, rather than a simple, 
God and thus lose our primary motivation for holding to the doctrine in the 
first place. Therefore, the question now becomes for a (Classical or Neo-Clas-
sical) adherent of the DDS: is there another alternative means of construing 
the DDS without facing the issues that plague the strong and weak interpreta-
tions? I believe that there is, through one adopting a middle position between 
the strong and weak DDS accounts, which we can term the moderate DDS 
account, or, more specifically, the Aspectival Account.20
18 Swinburne, The Christian God, 162.
19 Plantinga, Does God Have A Nature?, 31.
20 Terming the moderate DDS account here the “Aspectival Account” does not negate the 
importance of the trope-theoretic framework in which the account is developed — it just rolls 
of the tongue a lot more than the “Aspectival Trope-Theoretic Account”. Furthermore, there 
are potentially a number of “moderate DDS accounts” that are very different from (and slightly 




































The Aspectival Account is one that affirms, in line with the strong DDS, 
an identity between God and his properties, and his properties with each 
other. This affirmation, as was previously shown by Plantinga, will result in 
God being a property and his properties being numerically identical to one 
another. Thus, the Aspectival Account “bites the bullet” and accepts these im-
plications. However, by also assuming the “harmonisation move” of the weak 
DDS account, and re-situating it within a “trope-theoretic” and “aspectival” 
metaphysics, the Aspectival Account will be free from the absurdities that 
are derivable from the strong DDS. By utilising the Aspectival Account, one 
will thus be able to affirm, on the one hand, that God is a “property” without 
him losing his concreteness. And, on the other hand, one will also be able to 
affirm the identity of God’s “properties” with each other without each of these 
“properties” ceasing to be qualitatively different entities. The focus of the rest 
of this article will thus be on explicating and applying two particular the-
ses from contemporary metaphysics within this specific theological context, 
which will ultimately provide a consistent formulation of the DDS without 
one having to face the issues raised by the Many Properties and Property-
Identity problems (or the problem of transgressing the “sovereignty-aseity” 
intuition that plagued Swinburne’s weak DDS). 21
Thus, the plan is as follows: in section two (“Troping Simplicity”) I expli-
cate the central elements of “Classical Trope Theory” and apply them to God, 
which will deal with the Property-Identity Problem. Then, in section three 
weaker than) the moderate DDS account proposed here, such as the “Parsimonious Account” 
proposed by Oliver Crisp, “A Parsimonious Model of Divine Simplicity”, Modern Theology 35, 
no. 3 (2019): 558–73, it will be helpful to distinguish the present account from the others by 
continuing to refer to it as the Aspectival Account, which is thus simply to be taken as one of 
the possible moderate DDS accounts on the market.
21 For this proposal to work, two specific assumptions will need to be made: first, that of 
God’s nature, following Swinburne, being reducible to one property with all of the other di-
vine properties being related (in some sense) to this one property. This will serve as a basis 
for God’s properties to be identical to each other. Second, the conception of God within this 
account is identified as the God of Christianity (i.e. God is numerically identical to a person, 
the Father, who is a member of the Trinity), which will enable God to fulfil the requirements 
for being a “property” (without the problems raised by Plantinga being applicable to him). 
For an explanation of the historical basis for this second assumption, which has most recently 
been termed “Monarchical Trinitarianism”, see Beau Branson, “The Neglected Doctrine of the 
Monarchy of the Father and the Analytic Debate About the Trinity”, in Analytic Theology and 





































(“Aspecting Simplicity”) I explain the concept of an “aspect” and also apply it 
to God, which will deal with the Many-Properties Problem. Re-situating the 
DDS within these metaphysical frameworks will allow one to affirm the doc-
trine without having to face the problems raised by Plantinga. Finally, there 
will be a concluding section (“Conclusion”) which will summarise the above 
results and conclude the article.
II. TROPING SIMPLICITY
II.1 The Nature of Tropes
Classical Trope Theory is the specific theoretical framework proposed by 
Donald C. Williams, and further developed by “trope-theorists” such as Keith 
Campbell, Anna Sofia-Maurin, Douglas Ehring and A.R.J. Fisher, amongst 
others.22 According to Williams and the trope-theorists, a trope is to be con-
strued as such:
(10) (Trope): An entity is a trope if it is an abstract particular nature of a 
modifier or modular kind.
In breaking these concepts down, the first concept featured in (Trope): 
abstractness, is a word, as Fisher notes, that “is vague, imprecise, and am-
biguous, like many other words in our philosophical theories and ordinary 
language”.23 That is, there is not a single conception of the term “abstract”. 
However, trope-theorists, in disambiguating this term, focus on the original 
and broadest sense of the word, as Williams writes: “At its broadest the “true” 
meaning of “abstract” is partial, incomplete, or fragmentary, the trait of what 
is less than its including whole”.24 Thus, a trope is abstract in the sense that it 
22 Donald C. Williams, “On the Elements of Being”, Review of Metaphysics 7 (1953): 171–92; 
Donald C. Williams, “Universals and Existents”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1986): 
1–14; Keith Campbell, Abstract Particulars (Blackwell, 1990); Anna-Sofia Maurin, If Tropes 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002); Anna-Sofia Maurin, “Tropes”, in Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy; Douglas Ehring, Tropes: Properties, Objects and Mental Causation (Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2011); A.R.J. Fisher, “Instantiation in Trope Theory”, American Philosophical 
Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2018): 153–64; A.R.J. Fisher, “Abstracta and Abstraction in Trope Theory”, 
Philosophical Papers 49, no. 1 (2020): 41–67.
23 Fisher, “Abstracta and Abstraction in Trope Theory”, 44.
24 Williams, “On the Elements of Being”, 186, emphasis in text.




































does not exhaust its content, or is, in some sense, less than its content. This is 
in contrast, firstly, to the meaning of the word “concrete”, which, according 
to Williams, is “if not the main thing which this means is that, however dis-
continuous the placetime, or “plime”, which just contains such an object, the 
object exhausts or is the whole content of it”.25 And thus, as Williams further 
adds, “abstract entities differ from concreta in that many of them can and 
do occupy the same plime”.26 Thus, for example, a shape-trope that a table 
possesses is abstract because it does not exhaust its content, as other tropes, 
such as a colour-trope and a mass-trope, are also collocated with the shape-
trope by occupying the same content. However, in contrast, the table would 
be concrete by itself exhausting its content, and thus not allowing another 
table (or object) to also occupy this content. The table would be a concrete en-
tity, whilst the shape of the table would be an abstract entity. Thus, in further 
emphasising this distinction, Campbell helpfully writes:
Abstract here contrasts with concrete: a concrete entity is the totality of the 
being to be found where our colours, or temperatures or solidities are. The 
pea is concrete; it monopolises its location. All the qualities to be found 
where the pea is are qualities of that pea. But the pea’s quality instances are 
not themselves so exclusive. Each of them shares its place with many others.27
Following Fisher,28 we can state the position expressed by Williams and 
Campbell more schematically by defining abstract entities as such:
(11) (Abstract): An entity is abstract iff this entity fails to exhaust the content 
of the region it occupies or is merely part of that region’s content.
This definition of “abstractness” shows that an entity is abstract, not because 
of its relation (or lack thereof) to spatiotemporal reality, as is often held in 
25 Williams, “Universals and Existents”, 3.
26 Ibid., 3.
27 Campbell, Abstract Particulars, 2–3. This use of the term “abstract” (and concrete) also 
contrasts with the prevalent understanding of the term, which sees an abstract entity as 
something that has, for concrete entities, or lacks, for abstract entities, spatiotemporal location 
or causal efficacy (Fisher, 2019). Thus, as Campbell, Abstract Particulars, 3, further writes, 
focusing on abstract entities: Abstract does not imply indefinite, or purely theoretical. Most 
importantly, it does not imply that what is abstract is non-spatiotemporal. The solidity of 
this bell is a definite, experienceable and locatable reality. It is so definite, experienceable and 
locatable and that it can knock your head off, if you are not careful.





































areas of contemporary metaphysics, but simply because it fails to exhaust the 
content of the region that is located (or is a part of the content of that region).
Turning our attention to the second concept featured in (Trope): particu-
larity, in a similar vein to the abstractness of a trope, a trope’s particularity is 
defined in a specific way within the Classical Trope Theory. In a general set-
ting, universals are regularly taken to be entities that can be wholly present in 
different locations simultaneously.29 In contrast, particulars are taken to not 
be able to be wholly present in different locations simultaneously. However, 
Williams and the trope-theorists have proposed an alternative means of dis-
tinguishing properties as universals, from properties as particulars, through 
Leibniz’s Law. This specific account can be expressed succinctly as such:
(12) (Particular): An entity is particular if it is possible that there exists a 
duplicate (i.e. an exactly similar copy) of that entity.
In further elucidating this view, Williams writes that:
Entities determined and named in the first principle, by definition not subject 
to the identity of indiscernibles, are cases or particulars; entities determined 
in the second way, by definition subject to the identity of indiscernibles, are 
“general” entities, that is, kinds or universals.30
The central contention here is that of universals, but not particulars, con-
forming to Leibniz’s Law.31 By not conforming to Leibniz’s Law, particulars 
are thus entities, as Williams further writes, which “may be exactly similar 
and yet not only distinct but discrete”.32 Thus, for example, according to this 
account, a shape-trope is particular because it is possible that there is a du-
plicate of this shape, that is, an entity that is exactly similar, but also distinct 
from this shape. If a property (or a given entity) obeys Leibniz’s Law, then it 
is universal. If it does not obey this principle, then it is particular. Thus, for 
properties as universals, the principle holds, in that exactly similar entities 
(universals) are identical (i.e. if universal x and universal y are indiscernible, 
then x = y). Whereas for particulars (e.g. tropes), the principle does not hold, 
as exactly similar entities can be distinct (i.e. if trope x and trope y are indis-
29 Fraser MacBride, “Whence the Particular-Universal Distinction?”, Grazer Philosophische 
studien 67 (2004): 181–94.
30 Williams, “Universals and Existents”, 8.
31 Ehring, Tropes: Properties, Objects and Mental Causation, 32–25.
32 Williams, “Universals and Existents”, 3.




































cernible, then x ≠ y). Given this conception of particularity, a trope is thus 
particular if it can have a duplicate.
Closely related to the concepts of abstractness and particularity is the third 
concept featured in (Trope): the primitive nature of a trope. That is, the con-
cept of a nature, within this theoretical framework, is taken to be an unanalys-
able notion (i.e. a primitive) that directly applies to a given trope.33 A trope is 
thus a (qualitative) nature, in that it does not have, or possess, a nature of its 
own; rather, the nature of a trope is intrinsic to it. A helpful way to construe 
intrinsicality, as noted by James Alvarado, is through Rae Langton and David 
Lewis’, Independence Account of Intrinsicality.34 Where a property P, accord-
ing to Alvarado (following Lewis and Langton), “is combinatorially intrinsic 
if and only if the instantiation of P by an object x is indifferent to the fact that 
x is alone or accompanied in a possible world.35 An object x is alone in a pos-
sible world w if and only if there is no other object besides x in w. An object 
that is not alone is accompanied. Thus, the nature of a trope is combinatorially 
intrinsic if and only if this nature of the trope is invariant under the scenarios 
in which the given trope is alone or accompanied.36 However, the modal in-
variance of a trope, unlike other entities, is not grounded upon the possession 
of an intrinsic nature, but that of it being its intrinsic nature. There is noth-
ing more to a trope than its nature and thus, as noted by Maurin, tropes, at a 
general level, “have no constituents, in the sense that they are not “made up” 
or “built” from entities belonging to some other category”.37 Tropes are thus 
primitively qualitative and irreducible entities. They are, in a sense, simple.
The final concept featured in (Trope) concerns the different types of 
tropes that exist: “tropes” and “tropers”. Michael Loux introduces this dis-
tinction as such:
Whereas tropes are particular properties — things like this redness, this 
triangularity, this pallor, tropers are thin individuals — things like this 
individual red thing, this individual triangular thing, and this individual pale 
thing. The claim would be that familiar objects are bundles of compresent 
33 Fisher, “Instantiation in Trope Theory”, 154.
34 Rae Langton and David Lewis, “Defining Intrinsic”, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 58 (1998): 334–37. Given the complexity and space required to unpack Langton and 
Lewis’, account, the brief explanation here will be based on Alvarado’s interpretation of it.
35 José T. Alvarado, “Are Tropes Simple?”, Teorema 38 (2019): 53–54.
36 Alvarado, “Are Tropes Simple?”, 54.





































tropers. So the view would again dispense with properties and insist that the 
ultimate constituents of familiar particulars are intrinsically characterised 
or natured, but would construe those constituents as particulars rather than 
universals. Such intrinsically characterised particulars would be the ultimate 
or underived sources of character: a familiar particular would be, say, pale 
because it has a pale troper as a constituent.38
The central difference between a trope and a troper, according to Loux, is that 
of the former being a singly (or minimally) characterising property, whilst the 
latter is a singly (or minimally) charactered property in a “stretched” (or ana-
logical) sense —  it is a “propertied thing or object” (hereafter, property*).39 
Thus, within this construal of Classical Trope Theory, there is an ontological 
difference between entities that are properties and entities that are properties*.
However, off of this distinction, Robert K. Garcia notes that Loux’s divi-
sion between a trope and a troper is not a novel suggestion, but is, in fact, the 
prevalent view of tropes found within the literature.40 According to Garcia, 
Loux’s distinction between a “trope” and a “troper” is thus best described as a 
distinction between two different concepts of a trope. Hence, Garcia sees that 
the two terms “trope” and “troper” are potentially misleading, and thus he 
introduces the more helpful terms of a “modifier trope” (for Loux’s “trope”) 
and a “module trope” (for Loux’s “troper”). Given this conceptual distinction 
and re-labelling, the difference between these two trope concepts can now be 
expressed succinctly as such:
(13) (Modifier): An entity is a modifier trope if it is a singly, maximally-
thin property that does not have the character that it grounds.
38 Michael Loux, “An Exercise in Constituent Ontology”, in The Problem of Universals in Contem-
porary Philosophy, ed. Gabrielle Galluzzo and Michael Loux (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015), 31.
39 I leave the account of analogy here undefined.
40 For a more detailed comparison than what can be presently provided here of the different 
conceptions of a trope, see Robert K. Garcia, “Two Ways to Particularize a Property”, Journal 
of the American Philosophical Association 1 (2015): 635–52; Robert K. Garcia, “Is Trope Theory 
a Divided House?”, in The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy, eds. Gabrielle 
Galluzzo and Michael Loux (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015), 133–155; Robert K. Garcia, 
“Tropes as Character-Grounders”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2016): 499–515. And 
for an alternative application of Garcia’s position within a theological context, see Robert K. 
Garcia, “Tropes as Divine Acts: The Nature of Creaturely Properties in a World Sustained by 
God”, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7, no. 3 (2015): 105–30.




































(14) (Module): An entity is a module trope if it is a singly, maximally-thin 
property* that possesses the character that it grounds.
At a general level, modifier tropes and module tropes are both taken to be 
non-shareable, maximally-thin (i.e. singly charactered), character-ground-
ers.41 The central difference between these two types of tropes is that of a 
modifier trope being a property that does not exemplify this character, but 
simply bestows it upon (i.e. “makes”) something else to be charactered in that 
specific way. Thus, for example, a particular object is spherical in virtue of its 
modifier trope, which “spherises” that object by simply making it spherical 
without it sharing in that character as well. The character grounding provided 
by a modifier trope is thus de novo (or sui generis).42
Whilst, a module trope is a property* that exemplifies the character that 
it grounds (i.e. is self-exemplifying). Thus, for example, a particular (thickly-
charactered) object is spherical and red in virtue of its module tropes, which 
are themselves spherical and red (i.e. exemplify sphericity and redness), and 
together (compresently) are parts (or constituents) of that object. A module 
tropes” character grounding, rather than being de novo, can thus be taken to 
be some type of parthood (or constitution) relation.43 Furthermore, an ad-
ditional distinction between modifier and module tropes is the role played by 
these types of tropes in causation. As Maurin writes,
According to a majority of the trope theorists, tropes have an important role 
to play in causation. It is, after all, not the whole stove that burns you, it is 
its temperature that does the damage. And it is not any temperature, nor 
temperature in general, which leaves a red mark. That mark is left by the 
particular temperature had by this particular stove now or, in other words, it 
is left by the stove’s temperature-trope.44
At a more specific level, it is solely module tropes, rather than modifier tropes, 
that can play any direct role in causation. As in Maurin’s example, a modifier 
hotness trope cannot fulfil the role of being the direct cause of the burn mark, 
as it is not itself hot — something else must thus be the direct cause of the 
burn mark. Yet, this is not a unique problem for the modifier view, as Gar-
41 Garcia, “Is Trope Theory a Divided House?”, 142.
42 Garcia, “Tropes as Character-Grounders”, 503.
43 Ibid., 503.





































cia notes, “mass tropes are not massive, charge tropes are not charged, and 
so on. Thus, unlike module tropes, modifier tropes seem ineligible to play 
a direct role in causation”.45 Modifier tropes, in a similar manner to univer-
sals, are thus causally inert. However, the modular view does not have this 
issue, given that module tropes are self-exemplifying entities, resulting, in 
our example above, in a modular hotness trope being the direct cause of the 
burn mark. Thus, again, at a more specific level, it is module tropes, and not 
modifier tropes, that are uniquely suited to be the basic terms of causation.46 
Given these differences, the conceptual distinction between these two types 
of tropes can be illustrated as such:
Figure 1.3 Trope Conceptual Distinction
Thus, in sum, a trope, within Classical Trope Theory, is an abstract particular 
nature. As an abstract particular nature, a trope can either be a modifier, and 
thus be a maximally-thinly charactered property that is not self-exemplifying 
(i.e. does not exemplify the character that it bestows). Or, it can be modular, 
and thus be a maximally-thinly charactered property* that is self-exempli-
fying (i.e. exemplifies the character that it bestows). We thus have a detailed 
explication here of the nature of a trope, and off of this basis, we can now turn 
our attention to re-construing the nature of God as a trope in the modular 
sense of the word.
45 Garcia, “Two Ways to Particularize a Property”, 643.
46 Ibid., 642.




































II.2 God as a Module Trope
God is a module trope — an abstract particular nature of a modular kind, 
and in understanding this claim, we can now unpack each of the concepts 
featured in (Trope) within this specific theistic context. The first concept 
featured in (Trope): abstractness, is concerned with an entity being “partial, 
incomplete, or fragmentary”, and with the trait of it being “less than the in-
cluding whole”. Thus, we can take God to be abstract in this sense, rather than 
the “spatiotemporal” sense assumed (and rejected) by Plantinga. That is, God 
is less than his including whole, which, assuming Christian Trinitarianism, 
is the Trinity itself. Thus, God does not, in accord with (Abstract), exhaust 
his “content” or “plime” (or is less than his “content” or “plime” ), where his 
content is taken to the Trinity as a whole, and the plime to be the location in 
which the Trinity is located at. For God, who we can identify as the Father, 
there are two other Trinitarian persons: the Son and the Holy Spirit, who 
are exactly located where the Father is. The Father, the Son and the Holy 
Spirit are each collocated with each other by occupying the same content and 
plime — that of the Trinity. God is an abstract entity without this negating 
him being concrete in the Plantingian (spatiotemporal sense).
Concerning the notion of particularity, which is the second concept fea-
tured in (Trope), a given entity is particular, in accord with (Particular), by 
it failing to abide by Leibniz’s Law, and thus permitting the possibility of the 
existence of an entity (i.e. a duplicate) that is exactly similar in its intrinsic 
properties (i.e. its nature) to the first entity, yet is not identical to it. Whereas 
a universal, however, is taken to be the denial of this (i.e. an entity abiding by 
Leibniz’s Law and thus not permitting a duplicate of the given entity). Given 
this understanding of these terms, God is not a universal in that, assuming 
Trinitarianism again, Leibniz’s Law does not hold. As for God (who is iden-
tified as the Father), there exist duplicate entities of him: the Son and the 
Holy Spirit. That is, the Trinitarian persons are exactly similar to each other 
(i.e. each of the persons are divine, in the exact same way), but they are still 
distinct entities — the Father ≠ the Son, the Son ≠ Spirit and the Father ≠ the 
Spirit. Thus, according to this construal of particularity, God is a particular 
entity. God is abstract and particular,
Yet, in line with the third concept featured in (Trope): the primitive rela-
tion between a trope and its nature, God is also one that possesses a (quali-





































stantiates a nature distinct from himself, but that he simply is that nature. 
God’s nature is intrinsic to him. That is, it is combinatorially intrinsic, in that 
his nature is invariant under the scenarios in which he is alone (assuming 
per impossible the other Trinitarian persons did not exist) or accompanied 
(assuming the existence of the other Trinitarian persons and wider reality). 
God’s nature is modally invariant in both scenarios. Furthermore, God’s 
qualitative nature is primitive, in that it is not reducible to anything outside of 
himself. No nature is distinct from him. God is primitively qualitative — he 
is characterised as divine by his identity with this nature, which is not con-
stituted, made up, or built up by anything from a different category. God, 
as an abstract particular nature, is a primitively charactered and irreducible 
entity — God is, in a sense, simple.
Still, the question that is now presented to us is: what type of trope is God? 
That is, taking into account the conceptual distinction featured in (Trope), 
between a modifier and module trope, the more specific question now to be 
answered is: is God a modifier trope or a module trope? Well, it is quite clear 
that God is not a modifier trope, simply for the reason that God is the specific 
character that he bestows, which, in line with our second general assump-
tion noted above, is that of him being omnipotent. That is, God is a singly, 
maximally-thinly charactered property*, due to the fact that God possesses, 
or more specifically, is numerically identical to omnipotence. God is thus an 
omnipotence-trope, which we can illustrate as such (with the double-headed 
arrows representing an identity relation):
Figure 1.4 Theistic Trope Relationship




































By God being a module trope that is identical to omnipotence, this also ena-
bles the Trinity, which he constitutes with the Son and the Holy Spirit, to 
have the character of omnipotence as well. However, the character that the 
Trinity has is a reproduction of the character that God himself has. Thus, tak-
ing this all into account, as God is the character that he bestows, he cannot 
be a modifier trope. Instead, God should be taken to be a module trope in 
the sense of him being a maximally-thinly charactered property* — an om-
nipotence trope — that is self-exemplifying and serves the role of bestowing 
this characteristic upon the Trinity which he constitutes. Furthermore, since 
God is an omnipotence-trope of a modular kind, he plays a direct role in 
causation and is thus a basic term of a causal relation.47 Thus, in sum: as an 
omnipotence-trope, God is a modular abstract particular nature that has the 
ability to perform any logically possible action.
Off of this position, we now have a means available to deal with Plant-
inga’s Property-Identity problem. According to the re-construal of DDS 
through this proposal, God is identical with omnipotence, and thus he is a 
property. However, the type of property that he is, is that of a trope — God is 
abstract (i.e. he does not exhaust the content that he is a part of), is particu-
lar (i.e. he can have duplicates) and is a qualitative nature (i.e. his nature is 
combinatorially intrinsic and identical to him). However, this does not imply 
that God exists as a causally inert entity, as he would be if he were a normal 
“property”.48 Instead, due to him being a property* — a module trope — God 
is a singly, maximally-thin object that is the character (i.e. omnipotence) that 
he grounds the Trinity with.49 And as a trope of this specific kind, he can fulfil 
the role of being the direct causal grounds of everything else. Therefore, God 
is a modular omnipotence-trope, and this omnipotence, instead of being a 
part or constituent of him, is identical to him. Thus, God is nothing more 
than his omnipotence. He has no constituents causing him to be “made up” 
or “built” from entities belonging to some other category which, in line with 
47 We can also say that God is in some sense a personal agent, as to exercise his omnipotence, 
he must be an entity that has a rich form of consciousness that enables him to perform a range 
of actions that are solely limited by logic. Yet, positing God as a trope does not rob him of this 
personhood, given that he is a trope of a modular nature.
48 The mistaken assumption here could be that Plantinga operates within a Platonic 
substance/attribute framework where universals are indeed transcendent/non-spatiotemporal.





































the DDS, implies that he lacks parts (in the propertied sense) and is, there-
fore, a simple entity. Plantinga’s Property-Identity problem is thus unprob-
lematic once the DDS is re-situated within a trope-theoretic framework. We 
will now turn our attention to the Many-Properties problem to see if we can 
reach a similar result as well.
III. ASPECTING SIMPLICITY
III.1 The Nature of Aspects
Donald C. Baxter introduced the concept of an “aspect” into the contempo-
rary metaphysical literature in order to provide a coherent conceptual foun-
dation for the notion of qualitative self-differing (hereafter, self-differing).50 
Self-differing is the qualitative differing of some entity in one way (or respect) 
from itself in another. To help motivate the existence of aspects within this 
context, we can consider a case in which an individual is torn about what to 
do (or how to feel) in a certain situation:
David is an ardent philosophy professor and is also a loving and faithful 
father of two children, Jacob and Melissa. Now suppose that, firstly, David 
has an upcoming philosophy conference in which he is the keynote speaker 
and, due to other work commitments, has not prepared his speech yet. 
Secondly, suppose that David had previously promised that he would reward 
his children with a camping trip this upcoming weekend if they achieved A* 
grades in their A-Level results. And, thirdly, suppose that Jacob and Mellissa 
have both, in fact, recently achieved A* grades in their A-Level results.51
50 Baxter first introduced the concept of an aspect to provide clarity to the composition as 
identity debate in: Donald Baxter, “Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense”, Mind XCVII 
(1988): 575–82 and Donald Baxter, “Many-One Identity”, Philosophical Papers 17 (1988): 193–
216. There was then a detachment of the concept from this debate, and a further conceptual 
development of it in: Donald Baxter, “The Discernibility of Identicals”, Journal of Philosophical 
Research 24 (1999): 37–55. Most recently, Baxter has developed the concept of aspect into a 
fully working, multi-functional theory in: Donald Baxter, “Instantiation as Partial Identity”, 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2001): 449–64; Donald Baxter, “Aspects and the Al-
teration of Temporal Simples”, Manuscrito 39 (2016): 169–81. Donald Baxter, “Self-Differing, 
Aspects, and Leibniz’s Law”, Noûs 52 (2018): 900–920 and Donald Baxter, “Oneness, Aspects, 
and the Neo-Confucians”, in The Oneness Hypothesis: Beyond the Boundary of Self, ed. Phillip 
J. Ivanhoe et al. (Columbia Univ. Press, 2018), 90–105.
51 This example is based on a similar example provided by Baxter, “Self-Differing, Aspects, 
and Leibniz’s Law”, 901–2. In motivating aspects, Baxter believes that the clearest cases, as 




































In this specific scenario, David is in a situation of self-differing as he knows 
that he has an important keynote speech that he needs to prepare. David being 
an ardent philosophy professor results in him wanting to fulfil this commit-
ment and thus complete his speech. So, the following proposition would be 
true: David “does not want to take his children on a camping trip this upcoming 
weekend”. However, having promised his children that he would reward them 
for their academic achievement, and being a loving and faithful father, he 
wants to fulfil his promise to them. So, the following conflicting proposition 
would also be true: David “wants to take his children on a camping trip this 
weekend”. David is torn. He is in conflict with himself. He thus differs from 
himself. David’s struggle is between two aspects of him: David insofar as he is 
a philosopher versus David insofar as he is a father. This, and other cases of 
internal conflict, are cases of self-differing, where the subjects of what differs 
are the aspects of the individual that self-differs. Thus, for the case to be one of 
differing, one aspect must possess a quality that another aspect lacks. And for 
it to be a case of self-differing, then the aspects must be numerically identical 
with the individual that bares them. 52
At a semantic level, the aspects in these cases of self-differing, as seen 
above, are expressed through “nominal qualifiers” such as “insofar as” (or 
“in some respect” and to a lesser extent “as” and “qua”). Nominal qualifiers 
serve a special role of referring to aspects — they are specifically present with-
in self-differing cases, where the same entity can be discernible from itself. 
Furthermore, following Jason Turner,53 the use of a nominal qualifier in these 
cases (and other cases like them) can be further precisified via formalisa-
tion — where one takes “α” as a regular term and “φ(y)” as any formula open 
in y, and thus we can introduce a term to refer to aspects, namely an aspect 
term, written as such: “αy[φ(y)]”. From this semantic basis, we can now pro-
in the example in the main text, are those of the internal psychological conflict of a person. 
However, self-differing, according to Baxter, is not only confined to these psychological con-
flicts but, as Baxter writes, cases “of being torn give us the experiences by which we know that 
there are numerically identical, qualitatively differing aspects. We feel them”, Baxter, “Oneness, 
Aspects, and the Neo-Confucians”, 104. Thus, at a general level, as we will see, self-differing is 
present in any case where an entity has a property and lacks it at the same time, in the virtue 
of playing different roles.
52 Baxter, “Self-Differing, Aspects, and Leibniz’s Law”, 907.
53 Jason Turner, “Donald Baxter’s Composition as Identity”, in Composition as Identity, ed. 





































gress onto the ontological level, which will allow us to further elucidate the 
nature of an aspect.
At the ontological level, according to Baxter, aspects are difficult to dis-
tinguish from other entities.54 However, we can begin to acquire an under-
standing of their nature by describing their functional role and the relation-
ship to the individuals that bear them. Primarily, the aspects of an individual 
function as the particular ways of being of that individual. A way of being is a 
conceptually primitive notion that can be glossed in part by taking it to be the 
way or manner in which an entity exists. That is, as Jerrod Levinson notes, “an 
object’s ways of being are the varied fashion in which it goes the complicate 
business of existing”.55 Thus, aspects function as the particular ways in which 
individuals are. However, as ways of being of an individual, aspects are not 
qualities (or properties) as they, themselves, possess qualities (or properties) 
due to their numerical identity to the individuals that bear them.56 Aspects, 
however, do not possess all of the qualities that the particular individuals that 
they are aspects have. Moreover, in a similar manner to their bearers, they are 
particular entities — rather than universals — through Leibniz’s Law failing to 
hold for them.57 Secondly, despite the numerical identity between individu-
als and their aspects, aspects are not “complete individuals”, due to the fact 
that complete individuals are entities that can exist independently. Instead, 
according to Baxter, aspects are “incomplete entities” due to them “having 
fewer properties than it takes to exist on one’s own”.58 Aspects are thus incom-
plete in the sense of them being dependent upon the complete individuals 
54 As Baxter, “Self-Differing, Aspects, and Leibniz’s Law”, 13, writes, “aspects should not be 
confused with Casteneda’s guises, or Fine’s qua-objects, or other such attenuated entities”.
55 Jerrold Levinson, “Properties and Related Entities”, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 39 (1978): 2. This functional role fulfilled by an aspect is similar to that of “mode”, 
which has recently been re-introduced into the literature by Jonathan E. Lowe, The Four-
Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation For Natural Science (Oxford Univ. Press, 2006), 
23–24, and John Heil, The Universe As We Find It (Oxford Univ. Press, 2012), 3–4. However, 
the central difference between an aspect and a mode is that the former, and not the latter, is 
numerically identical with the individual that bears it.
56 In reference to aspects, there will be an interchanging of the term “qualities” with the term 
“properties”. However, the former term is preferable over the latter term, as it helps us to ward 
of mistaking the entities that are born by aspects to be further entities that are ontologically 
different from them.
57 More on this below.
58 Baxter, “Self-Differing, Aspects, and Leibniz’s Law”, 916.




































that they are numerically identical to. The nature of a complete individual 
determines the aspects that they have, in that they depend entirely upon how 
that individual entity is — once we have the individual, we also have its ways 
of being.59 Thirdly, aspects are not mereological parts of the individuals that 
they are aspects of, as, again, they are numerically identical to, rather than a 
“part” of, these individuals.60 Lastly, aspects are not mental abstractions. That 
is, even though a complete individual’s aspects are abstract entities (through 
them failing to exhaust the content or plime that they are aspects of),61 that 
can be considered by means of abstraction — where one abstracts a way that 
an individual is —  it is important to note, as Baxter writes, that the differ-
ence between a complete individual and their aspects is “a less-than-numer-
ical distinction but more than a mere distinction of reason”.62 Baxter terms 
this distinction an aspectival distinction, which results in the aspects of an 
individual only ever being two (or more) in a “loose” sense when they are 
counted based on qualitative distinction. However, in a “strict” sense, when 
the aspects are counted based on a numerical distinction, they are only ever 
one. Thus, aspects, as Baxter notes, provide a “complexity to the simple, i.e., a 
qualitative complexity to the quantitatively simple”.63
Taking this explanation of the semantic and ontological features of as-
pects into account, for further clarity, we can construe the concept of an as-
pect as such:
(15) (Aspect):
(a) An aspect is a qualitatively differing, incomplete abstract particular 
entity that is numerically identical to the complete individual that 
bears it (and any other aspect possessed by that individual).
(b) It functions as a particular way that a complete individual is and is 
determined by that individual’s nature.
59 Joaquim Giannotti, The Identity Theory of Powers Revised (2019), 2.
60 Baxter, “The Discernibility of Identicals”, 39.
61 Thus, the abstractness and particularity of an aspect fit neatly with that of a trope’s 
abstractness and particularity that was noted above.
62 Baxter, “Oneness, Aspects, and the Neo-Confucians”, 99.





































(c) It is expressed through a Nominal Qualifier such as “insofar as”, 
which, at a precise level, can be captured through the use of an 
aspect term (such as αy[φ(y)]).
(d) It is distinguishable through an aspectival distinction, rather than 
a numerical or conceptual distinction.
From this basic construal of an aspect, we can now return to our example of 
self-differing and re-construe the notion of self-differing to be that of the quali-
tative differing of numerically identical aspects possessed by an individual.64 So, 
for example, “David insofar as he is a philosopher” refers to one, numerically 
identical aspect of David and “David insofar as he is a father” refers to another, 
numerically identical aspect of him. Aspects can thus differ in their properties 
without the resultant differences indicating numerically distinct individuals.65 
More fully, we can apply some aspect terms to our self-differing example, where 
one aspect term of David would be: Davidy[y is a father], which is a name for 
“David insofar as he is a father”. And another aspect term of David would be 
Davidy[y is a philosopher] which is a name for “David insofar he is a philoso-
pher”. Thus, re-construing the above situation as such:
(16) Davidy[y is a philosopher] does not want to take his children on a 
camping trip this weekend.
and
(17) ∼Davidy[y is a father] does not want to take his children on a camping 
trip this weekend
It would seem as if one is affirming a contradiction. However, through the use 
of nominal qualifiers such as “insofar as” (i.e. formally αy[φ(y)]), it removes 
any explicit contradiction, as the above case does not say that it is David, un-
qualified, that does and does not want to take his children on a camping trip 
this weekend. Nor does it say that David, in one respect, does not want to take 
his children on a camping trip this weekend. Either of those, as Baxter notes, 
would indeed be contradictory.66 Rather it is simply Davidy[y is a father] (i.e. 
David insofar as he is a father) who wants to take his children on a camping trip 
64 Baxter, “Oneness, Aspects, and the Neo-Confucians”, 92.
65 Baxter, “Aspects and the Alteration of Temporal Simples”, 175.
66 Baxter, “Self-Differing, Aspects, and Leibniz’s Law”, 908.




































this weekend, and Davidy[y is a philosopher] (i.e. David insofar he is a philoso-
pher) who does not want to take his children on a camping trip this weekend. 
The negation, as Baxter writes, “is internal, that is, has short-scope relative to 
the nominal qualifier and so there is no contradiction”.67 Aspects of David have 
these qualities, but not David (unqualified). Furthermore, according to Baxter, 
Davidy[y is a philosopher] and Davidy[y is a father], as aspects of David, are 
identical to him. Thus, as Turner notes, Baxter endorses the following principle:
(18) (Aspect Identity): ∀x(∃z(z = xy[φ(y)]) → x = xy[φ(y)]).68
In reality, David is Davidy[y is a philosopher], and David is Davidy[y is a fa-
ther] —  David insofar as he is a particular way (i.e. as philosopher or father) 
is still David. Moreover, taking into account the characteristics of the nu-
merical identity relation (i.e. (6)–(8)), noted previously, this will result in:
(19) Davidy[y is a philosopher] = Davidy[y is a father]
which is that of David’s aspects each being numerically identical to one an-
other. Thus, in this context, the same thing can be abstractedly considered in 
two ways, and in this discernment, it can differ from itself whilst still being 
that same thing. David is numerically identical to the two above aspects (and 
a near-infinite amount other aspects), and these aspects are all numerically 
identical to each other. The same individual can possess qualitatively differing 
aspects that are nevertheless numerically identical to the individual that bears 
them and also with each other.
This all seems to be conceptually coherent; however, a pertinent issue ap-
pears to be in sight. That is, Leibniz’s Law seems to be transgressed within an 
aspectival framework, as the existence of aspects allows for there to be numeri-
cally identical entities that do not share the same qualities. Any violation of 
Leibniz’s Law will certainly be problematic for most individuals. However, once 
this issue is further investigated, we can, in fact, see that there is no violation 
of Leibniz’s Law within an aspectival framework as, according to Baxter, as-
pects allow “contradictories to be predicated of the same thing in a way that 
Leibniz’s Law is silent about”.69 We can begin to notice this “silence” by asking 
the question of why Leibniz’s Law should be taken to apply to all entities, with-
67 Baxter, “Oneness, Aspects, and the Neo-Confucians”, 104.
68 Turner, “Donald Baxter’s Composition as Identity”, 239.





































out restriction? Baxter sees that the issue might revolve around the frequently 
raised worry,70 that a relation that is not characterised by Leibniz’s Law is not 
identity. However, Baxter sees that the only reason for this attitude is that the 
principle seems to express the truth that no entity both possesses and lacks a 
property — that contradictions cannot exist in reality.71 Thus, as Baxter writes, 
“It may seem that the original Indiscernibility of Identicals [Leibniz’s Law] is 
just another way of saying that nothing both has and lacks a property, which is 
just another way of saying that no contradictions are true”.72 It thus seems that 
individuals regularly accord Leibniz’s Law (the Indiscernibility of Identicals) 
the same unassailable status that is regularly given to the Principle of Non-
Contradiction.73 However, following Aristotle, Baxter sees that what is central 
to the latter principle is solely that of nothing both possessing and lacking a 
property in the same respect at the same time. Thus, this formulation leaves 
room to manoeuvre as it opens up the possibility that, as Baxter writes, “some-
thing in one respect has a property that it in another respect lacks”.74 However, 
that claim is not contradictory, as a contradictory claim here would be for one 
to say that some individual in one respect possesses a property that in no re-
spect it possesses.75 Baxter’s non-contradictory claim is thus simply that some-
thing in one respect is numerically identical with itself in another respect.76 Thus, 
70 As noted by Ted Sider, “Parthood”, Philosophical Review 116 (2007): 51–91, “Defenders of 
strong composition as identity must accept this version of Leibniz’s Law; to deny it would arouse 
suspicion that their use of “is identical to” does not really express identity”. Likewise, as noted by 
Einar Bohn, “Composition as Identity: Pushing Forward”, Synthese (2019): 2, square parenthesis 
added, “[Leibniz’s Law] is simply conceptually rock bottom of what I mean by identity. So, 
violating it amounts to, at best, changing the subject”.
71 Baxter, “Self-Differing, Aspects, and Leibniz’s Law”, 908.
72 Ibid., 907.
73 Ibid., 908.
74 Baxter, 105. Baxter does not see any other reason in support of the absolute allegiance to 
the principle, rejecting Leibniz’s reason tied to his view of substance.
75 One might still comment that it is inconceivable to define numerical identity without 
utilising Leibniz’s Law, and thus Baxter’s approach should be rejected. However, Baxter notes 
that he is not defining identity; but instead is taking it as primitive. That is, for Baxter, “Self-
Differing, Aspects, and Leibniz’s Law”, 908, for one to be numerically identical is to be one 
single individual and to be numerically distinct is simply to be two single individuals, and thus 
it is the connection with cardinality, rather than qualitative sameness, which is essential to 
numerical identity, not some connection with qualitative sameness.
76 A single individual differs from itself by having two or more aspects. An important question 
that can be raised here is if the two-ness of the aspect entails a numerical distinctness between 




































based on this claim, some numerically identical things can qualitatively differ 
without an entailment of a contradiction. Baxter thus believes that we lack 
any substantial reason to believe that Leibniz’s Law applies to every entity 
without question, and states that “Leibniz’s Law should not be thought of as 
applying absolutely generally to anything that can be talked about; the argu-
ment that it must apply so generally, fails”.77 Rather it is important to consider 
the domain of quantification for Leibniz’s Law. That is, according to Baxter, 
Leibniz’s Law solely applies to individuals (i.e. complete/independent enti-
ties) and thus does not generalise over to aspects (i.e. incomplete/dependent 
entities). The non-contradictory internal negation in specific self-differing 
claims, such as David’s above, seems to suggest that Leibniz’s Law does not 
apply to aspects. Thus, there are certain cases in which identicals are discern-
ible, yet do not falsify the principle, namely, when an individual possesses 
aspects that are numerically identical to it (and each other). The same thing 
cannot be true and false of the same individual, in the same respect, with-
out entailing a contradiction.78 Yet, phrases such as “David insofar as he is a 
father” refer to aspects, which are incomplete entities, and not the complete 
individual that the aspect is numerically identical with. Thus, as Baxter notes, 
it is vital that one is sensitive to “aspectival reference”, which refers to aspects 
and is distinguishable from singular reference, which refers to complete enti-
ties.79 Singular reference, according to Baxter, is not sensitive to the aspectival 
distinction, whilst the former is. And once we are sensitive to this distinc-
tion, we can realise that the domain of quantification for Leibniz’s Law, in its 
original sense, as Baxter writes, “includes all the complete entities, but does 
not include the incomplete entities numerically identical to some of them”.80 
Thus, it follows that Leibniz’s Law does not preclude the numerically identi-
cal aspects of an individual from being qualitatively different from each other 
the aspects? Baxter, “Self-Differing, Aspects, and Leibniz’s Law”, 908, believes not, as counting 
aspects is only a loose way of counting individuals — aspects possessed by a single individual are 
counted as more than one in virtue of their qualitative difference; however, this does not entail a 
numerical difference that would result in the individual being more than one individual.








































and the individual themselves.81 Assuming the reality of aspects thus does not 
lead to a complete denial of Leibniz’s Law. Instead, there is only a denial of an 
unrestricted understanding of Leibniz’s Law that includes all complete and in-
complete entities within its domain. More can indeed be said here. However, 
for the task at hand, we can conclude that Leibniz’s Law does not apply to 
aspects, and thus it is coherent to posit the existence of qualitatively differing, 
yet numerically identical aspects, which will help us with our task of dealing 
with Plantinga’s Many-Properties problem. To this task, we now turn.
III.2 God’s Properties as Aspects
As God is numerically identical to an omnipotence-trope, he is a module trope 
that has the ability to perform any logically possible action. However, instead of 
this omnipotence-trope entailing the further properties of omniscience, omni-
presence, perfect freedom and perfect goodness (as the weak DDS account pos-
its), we can now “convert” these properties into aspects, which will also result 
in the entailment relation being converted into a relation of numerical identity. 
So, in mapping out this conversion process, we can illustrate this as such:
Figure 1.5 Aspectival and Relation Conversions
Given these conversions, the additional properties that were previously taken 
to be entailed by the property of omnipotence are now to be construed in an 
aspectival manner. We can begin to unpack this by focusing on the functional 
role of the “aspects of omnipotence” and the relationship that they have to 
the omnipotence-trope, which allows us to say that they are not properties, 
complete entities, or mereological parts. Rather, they are incomplete abstract 
particular entities that are numerically identical to a specific complete indi-
vidual and function as its ways of being. More fully, each of the aspects of om-
nipotence is numerically identical to the omnipotence-trope, yet they do not 
81 Baxter, “Self-Differing, Aspects, and Leibniz’s Law”, 909, sees Leibniz’s Law as being 
closely related to the further principle that co-referential terms are substitutable salva veritate. 
However, he notes that this specific principle concerns only singular reference, and thus the 
substitution of expressions only refers to single individuals. One would thus need to provide 
an argument for why it should be generalised to aspects.




































possess the same characteristics as it — they are not the ability to perform any 
logically possible action. Lacking this characteristic, the aspects of omnipo-
tence are thus incomplete entities, in that they are dependent on the omnipo-
tence-trope, which exists as a complete entity (i.e. an independently existing 
entity). These aspects of omnipotence do not exhaust the content or plime 
that they are aspects of (i.e. they each do not exhaust the omnipotence-trope), 
and they each function as ways that the omnipotence trope exists, which we 
can consider through a process of abstraction. This aspectival construal of the 
divine properties, thus allows us to re-define each of the properties as such:
Properties Properties  
Definition
Aspects Aspects Definition
Omniscience Knowing of all 
true propositions 
and believing no 
false proposition








far as it is the ability 
to know of all true 
propositions and 
believing no false 
proposition (i.e. 
be omniscient).
Omnipresence Being cognizant 
of, and causally 
active at, every 
point of space.








sofar as it is the 
ability to be cogni-
zant of, and caus-
ally active at, every 















sofar as it is the 
ability to have no 
non-rational causal 
influence determin-













































of action, if there 
is one, many 
good actions and 
no bad actions







sofar as it is the 
ability to perform 
the best action/
kind of action (if 
there is one), many 
good actions and 
no bad actions (i.e. 
be perfectly good).
Table 1.2 Aspects Conversion
At a specific level, these aspects of omnipotence are focused on the different 
particular ways in which the omnipotence-trope is. That is, by this module 
trope having (or, more specifically, being) the singular-character of omnipo-
tence, it would exist in a particular manner and have certain limitless abilities 
that enable it to fulfil different roles. This functional role fulfilled by the omnip-
otence-trope allows one to establish an aspectival distinction that takes these 
ways to be aspects of this specific trope. Therefore, as was seen with our previ-
ous example, we have a case of self-differing here. The subjects of this differing 
would be the aspects of the omnipotence-trope, with each aspect possessing 
a quality that each of the other aspects lacks.82 For instance, focusing on the 
omniscient-aspect and the freedom-aspect, we have the following examples:
82 An issue could be raised here concerning the possession of qualities by the aspects of 
omnipotence robbing the omnipotence-trope of its property-simplicity. More precisely, one 
could say that, for example, by the omniscience-aspect having a certain quality, it would result 
in the omnipotence also having that quality and thus not being simple. However, against 
this, following Baxter, “Self-Differing, Aspects, and Leibniz’s Law”, 910, we can hold to the 
secundum quid ad simpliciter inference being blocked within an aspectival context, as it doesn’t 
follow from the fact that an aspect of an individual has a certain quality that the individual also 
has that quality. As Baxter, “Self-Differing, Aspects, and Leibniz’s Law”, 910, writes “‘Socrates 
insofar as he is wise is admirable’ does not entail “Socrates is wise” He may be wise only to a 
very limited extent and mostly foolish, so that “Socrates is not wise” is what is true”. Similarly, 
in our theistic context, “Omnipotence (unqualified)” does not have the quality and/or ability 
to know of all true propositions and believe no false proposition (and the other qualities that 
are entailed by this such as that of knowing what happened in New York on January 1st 2 A.D), 
as it solely has the singular character of being the ability to perform any logically possible action. 




































(20) Omnipotencey[y is knowledge] enables its bearer to know whether it 
snowed in New York on January 1st 2 A.D.
(21) ~Omnipotencey[y is freedom] enables its bearer to know whether it 
snowed in New York on January 1st 2 A.D.
And, for the omnipresent-aspect and the goodness-aspect, we also have the 
following examples:
(22) Omnipotencey[y is presence] enables its bearer to be cognizant of, and 
causally active at, the Galactic Center.
(23) ~Omnipotencey[y is goodness] enables its bearer to be cognizant of, 
and causally active at, the Galactic Center.
In these examples, we do not have a case of internal conflict, as in the example 
of David above; however, it is a case of differing, by there being a qualitative 
difference between the aspects of the omnipotence-trope. And, importantly, 
it is a case of self-differing, as the aspects are numerically identical to the 
omnipotence-trope itself. This is certainly the case, as from the position that 
was reached in the previous section of God being numerically identical to the 
omnipotence-trope:
(24) God = Omnipotence.
we can now, within this aspectival framework, proceed to posit a numerical 
identity between the omnipotence-trope and the various aspects of omnipo-
tence:
(25) Omnipotence = Omnipotencey[y is knowledge]; Omnipotencey[y 
is presence]; Omnipotencey[y is freedom]; Omnipotencey[y is 
goodness].
Omnipotence insofar as it is a certain way (e.g. an omniscient way, an omni-
present way etc.) is still Omnipotence, which is still, at the bottom level, God. 
So, the statement “Omnipotence (unqualified) is not the ability to know of all true propositions 
and believing no false proposition” is what is true, and thus, instead, it is “Omnipotencey[y is 
knowledge] that has this quality and/or ability”, which shows that aspects of an individual can 
have qualities which the (unqualified) individual itself does not have. The omnipotence-trope 
can thus still be property-simple as its aspects are the bearers of the various qualities normally 





































Yet, due to the formal characteristics of the numerical identity relation (i.e. 
(6)–(8)), each of the aspects of omnipotence is also numerically identical to 
each of the other aspects:
(26) Omnipotencey[y is knowledge] = Omnipotencey[y is presence],
(27) Omnipotencey[y is presence] = Omnipotencey[y is freedom],
(28) Omnipotencey[y is freedom] = Omnipotencey[y is goodness].
Notably, however, there is no Leibniz’s Law failure here as this law solely ap-
plies to complete individuals and thus does not generalise over to these as-
pects of omnipotence, which exist as incomplete/dependent entities. Thus, 
within an aspectival context, the same thing: the omnipotence-trope, which 
is numerically identical to God, is discerned in multiple ways without ab-
surdity. And in this discernment, it differs from itself, whilst still being that 
same thing. More specifically, within this aspectival framework, there is one 
property*, the omnipotence-trope, that is identical to multiple aspects, which 
are, in turn, identical to one another. In short: God is the omnipotence-trope, 
the omnipotence-trope is the qualitatively differing omnipotence-aspects, 
and the qualitatively differing omnipotence-aspects are one another. The 
possession of “many properties” by God is thus, in fact, the possession of 
many qualitatively differing, yet numerically identical aspects. The aspects 
of omnipotence provide a certain “complexity to the simple” — a qualitative 
complexity to the quantitatively simple omnipotence-trope which God is. 
Thus, by utilising an aspectival distinction here, in a “loose” sense, focused 
on qualitative distinctiveness, we can indeed count a multiplicity of aspects 
within God. Yet, in a strict sense, focused on numerical distinctiveness, there 
is solely one self-same property*, the omnipotence-trope, which is differently 
considered. We can now illustrate the position reached here as such (with the 
double-headed arrows representing an identity relation):




































Figure 1.6 Aspectival Simplicity
Assuming the contemporary metaphysical conception of parthood intro-
duced above, if we conceive of God’s attributes as aspects, rather than as 
properties, we thus have the case of each of the divine qualities not being a 
proper part of God, as they are each not portions distinct from God. Rather 
each of these qualities is numerically identical to God himself — the aspects 
of omnipotence are at the “same mereological level” as God. Given this, the 
aspects of omnipotence are each improper parts of God (where “g” stands for 
God):
(29) (Divine Simplicity Parthood): Pxg ∧ x = g.
The aspectival analysis provided by the Aspectival Account thus allows the doc-
trine to fit with the Neo-Classical Theistic position, which conceives of God’s 





































nipotence to be literal parts of God. However, in line with the Classical Theistic 
conception of God (and unlike Swinburne’s “harmonisation account”), it can 
secure the sovereignty-aseity intuition, as God is not composed of proper parts 
which he is dependent upon. Instead, the parts posited here are improper parts, 
which are simply just God himself. God, within this account, thus remains sim-
ple, through lacking proper parts, but has a form of “qualitative complexity”, 
through possessing qualitatively differing improper parts.
From the position explicated in detail above, we can now respond to Plant-
inga’s Many Properties problem as such: omnipotence is one property*; however, 
God’s omniscience, omnipresence, perfect freedom and perfect goodness are 
not additional properties of God; rather, they are aspects of this one property*. 
However, there is no entailment relation between the property* of omnipotence 
and the aspects of omnipotence, as there is no numerical distinction between 
omnipotence and its aspects. Instead, there is a strict identity, with a sole qualita-
tive distinction between them. Yet, this lack of a numerical distinction between 
omnipotence and its aspects does not result in a negation of God’s multiple 
“character”, as the omnipotence-trope has a multiplicity of qualitatively differ-
ing aspects that ground this multiform character. Plantinga’s Many Properties 
problem is thus unproblematic once we take each of the divine properties to be 
aspects of omnipotence — one can still attribute multiple qualities to God even 
though there is, in a strict sense, solely one property* within the divine life.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the DDS has been consistently explicated through proposing a 
moderate formulation of the doctrine, which utilises the metaphysical concept 
of a “trope” and an “aspect”. The utilisation of these metaphysical concepts al-
lowed us to re-construe the nature of God as a module trope with qualitatively 
differing, yet numerically identical, aspects. This proposal thus takes God to be 
identical to the one omnipotence-trope — which is a property* (i.e. a module 
trope). And as the omnipotence-trope has aspects, it is identical to these as-
pects, which solely qualitatively differ. Thus, God is a property* and the quali-
ties of God, construed as aspects, are indeed identical as well. However, con-
tra Plantinga, by God and his qualities being identical in the manner detailed 
above, this does not lead to the Property-Identity and Many Properties prob-
lems. God, construed in this aspectival way, is unproblematically simple.
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